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1 Introduction  
The key objective of this study is to assess and explain the shape of institutional complexity 
or hybrid multilateralism that characterises  selected sub-fields of global climate governance. 
We understand institutional complexity as a diversity of international institutions that legally 
or functionally overlap in addressing a given issue area of global governance. They do so 
while potentially differing “in their character (organizations, regimes, and implicit norms), 
their constituencies (public and private), their spatial scope (from bilateral to global), and 
their subject matter (from specific policy fields to universal concerns)” (Biermann et al. 2009, 
p. 16). 
While there are ample analyses of the institutional complexity of the overall climate 
governance architecture, there are at least two research gaps. First, there is a seeming divide 
between institutionalist studies that mainly examined international regimes and 
transnationalist approaches which often excluded these regimes and instead rather focused on 
emission trading systems, accounting schemes or city networks (cf. Betsill et al. 2005). 
Bridging or overarching analyses of the mix of public and private institutional arrangements 
are still the exception. Second, there has been only scant attention for the institutional 
complexity of specific issues within global climate governance.  
Against this backdrop, we zoom into global climate governance and its complexity to allow 
for a manageable analysis of the mix of public and private institutions, or hybrid 
multilateralism, on specific sub-fields. Instead of scrutinizing the complexity of this field as a 
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whole, we seek to compare institutional complexity and its consequences for three distinct 
issues of high policy relevance: climate engineering; reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation (REDD); and short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs).  
We have selected these cases, since: (1) all of them are highly dynamic areas of international 
climate policy that have experienced significant institutional development outside of the 
UNFCCC in recent years; (2) they are relatively new and still represent major gaps in 
governance research in general and institutional analysis in particular, nonetheless, their 
development so far allows for crucial research-based insights and lessons; (3) they allow for 
novel comparative findings, since they vary significantly in the degree of complexity, in 
particular the number of the major institutions involved in their regulation, and in the level of 
coherence among these institutions; and (4) they also vary in the constellation of actors 
(country coalitions) and with different levels of involvement of business and civil society 
actors. 
For each of these issue areas, the article addresses two questions on the shape and causes of 
the hybrid multilateralism of global climate governance. First, what is the role of private and 
hybrid authority institutions in complex climate governance architectures? Here we are 
interested in identifying the functions that private or hybrid arrangements have come to carry 
out in a governance architecture and how these relate to the roles of public institutions.. 
Second, what are the underlying causes of institutional complexity within and across the three 
issue areas? We aim to gain insights into how theoretical approaches, based on problem-
structural institutionalism and private governance analysis, can help us address these 
questions.  
Section 2 sketches our conceptual and analytical framework. It introduces, for the first 
research question, criteria for assessing mixed governance architectures; and, for the second 
research question, potential explanations of the different architecture mixes, or degrees of 
complexity, in the three issue areas under scrutiny, based on theories of problem structure and 
private authority. Sections 3, 4 and 5 provide an explorative application of this framework – a 
full-fledged application would go beyond the scope of this paper. We identify the roles of 
private and hybrid authority for the issue areas of REDD, SLCPs, and climate engineering, 
and then briefly examine the plausibility of the explanatory factors we established in Section 
2. Section 6 delivers cross-cutting findings for the three cases. 
 
2 Conceptual and Analytical Framework 
 
2.1 Institutional Complexity and Mixed Governance Architectures 
Biermann et al. (2009), argue that institutional complexity – in their terminology: institutional 
fragmentation – is a structural characteristic of any global governance architecture, but that 
the degree of fragmentation varies considerably across such architectures. Following the 
argument that institutional complexity is a matter of degree, the question is what are useful 
criteria in order to characterise and compare the respective mix between private and public 
institutions across issue areas.  
In the following, we distinguish the following dimensions: 1) centrality of one or several core 
public institutions, in terms of their functions qua mandate; 2) sources of private authority, 
and 3) the functional division of labour between public or other private institutions. 
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With regard to the centrality of public institutions, we differentiate roughly between 
architectures with a core institution, architectures with two or more identifiable cores, and 
architectures with no clear hierarchy. We build on Biermann et al. (2009) and Keohane and 
Victor (2011) with their predominantly legal criteria. Biermann and colleagues speak of 
synergistic fragmentation of a global governance architecture, when almost all countries 
participate in the core institution in an issue area, and where this institution “provides for 
effective and detailed general principles that regulate the policies in distinct yet substantially 
integrated institutional arrangements” (Biermann et al. 2009: 20). Conflictive fragmentation, 
by contrast, occurs when the institutions in a given architecture are hardly connected or have 
very different decision-making procedures.   
Notwithstanding the value of these typologies and criteria for the first dimension we 
mentioned above, they do not put emphasis on the specific mix of private and public 
institutions and the respective functions that each ‘camp’ mostly performs for a given 
architecture. For this, we need to look at a second strand of literature that scrutinises the roles 
of non-state actors and institutions.  
One approach to analyzing roles of private authority is to ask why non-state actors have taken 
on a governing role. Green (2014: 33-36) distinguishes two sources of private authority, 
delegated and entrepreneurial, depending on the origin of authority. Either a private 
institution has been instructed to create rules, set standards or perform other governance 
functions on behalf of the governed or a public institution; or a private institution has taken 
entrepreneurial initiative on its own to set rules or standards. By “the governed”, she refers to 
“those who obey” authority, meaning here those who adopt the rules of private actors who 
project this authority (ibid.: 29). 
This distinction, we hold, is connected to the centrality of a public institution in the area. If 
there is such a dominant institution, we can expect it to leave only a limited functional space 
to private institutions and, potentially, to play a role in the assignment of such functions 
through delegation. On the other hand, where such a dominant institution is missing, private 
authority institutions might have more space to fill existing governance gaps on their own 
entrepreneurial initiative. We are aware that our linkage of these two factors, public centrality 
and sources of private authority, is building on a rather short deduction and needs further 
theoretical foundation and, ultimately, corroboration through empirical analyses.  
This said, Green’s distinction of sources is meant for private governance institutions only, not 
for hybrid ones like public-private partnerships. For these, it will be important to examine 
where the initiative for cooperation has ultimately come from: from public institutions that 
seek collaboration to entrust private ones with certain functions (delegated authority); or from 
private institutions that seek public legitimation and support for their governance initiative 
(entrepreneurial authority).    
A different question is how private governance institutions play a role in global governance, 
either duplicating or replacing public institutions for these functions, or filling the governance 
gaps they leave. Building on some of the leading literatures on this issue (Abbott and Snidal 
2010; Abbott et al. 2015; Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009; Cutler et al. 1999; Pattberg 2005), 
and in particular on Abbott (2012), we distinguish the following functions: setting standards 
and commitments; sharing information and networking; financing; and operational activities 
(here in particular: implementing and evaluating). Most of these functions belong to the 
classical policy cycle known from public institutions or, like financing or knowledge 
brokering and networking (cf. Christopoulos & Ingold 2015; Stone 2008, 2013), they are 
relatively easy to identify and delimit.  
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Table 1 summarises the criteria through which we will assess the institutional complexity of 
the three selected governance architectures. 
 
Table 1. Dimensions of institutional complexity in mixed architectures. 
DIMENSIONS VALUES 
Centrality of public authority 
one core institution;  
two or more identifable 
cores; 
no clear hierarchy.  
Sources of private authority 
delegated; 
entrepreneurial. 
Distribution of functions 
among public and private 
institutions 
setting standards and 
commitments; 
financing; 




2.2 Explaining Different Degrees of Complexity and Architecture Mixes 
Having identified dimensions for assessing mixed governance architectures, how can we 
explain differences across issue areas? For this purpose, we distinguish two types of theory-
guided assumptions: 
1) those derived from the problem-structural strand of institutionalism, in order to explain the 
degree of centrality, or lack thereof, of public institutions as well as, to a certain extent, 
potential sources of private authority; 
2) those derived from private authority theory, in order to explain the functional mix between 
public and private institutions. 
We chose the first set of theories, because the considerable variation of institutional 
complexity across issue areas suggests that the nature of this issue areas may have a causal 
impact. What is more, as we show in the following, international relations theory has 
successfully recurred to problem-structural approaches when explaining the shape and 
likeliness of a public institutions – which insinuates that such theories may also have a word 
to say about the shape of whole governance architectures or regime complexes.  
On the other hand, was we further argue below, different strands of regime theory focus too 
strongly on the role of public institutions and leave a theoretical gap when it comes to 
explaining the emergence and functions of private and hybrid arrangements. Here, private 
authority approaches come closest to filling this gap.  
As for public centrality and sources of private authority, one theoretical approach that lends 
itself as a potential explanation focuses on the substantive or material nature of the issue area 
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to be regulated. Rittberger and Zürn (1990, 1991, 1992) distinguish different types of 
conflicts among actors according to the object of contention. Based on earlier typologies by 
Aubert (1963) and Kriesberg (1982), Rittberger and Zürn (1990: 31-32) differentiate between 
conflicts over values, conflicts over means and two types of conflicts of interests.  
Conflicts over means and values are both classified as dissensual conflicts, as actors disagree 
on the collective subject of the conflict: whereas in the first case, actors share a common goal 
but disagree on the means to pursue it, conflicts over values are based on “incompatible 
principled beliefs regarding the legitimacy of a given action or practice” (Hasenclever, Mayer 
and Rittberger 1997: 63).  
Conflicts of interest, on the other hand, are consensual, as actors value the same scarce good. 
It is exactly this congruence of interests that makes these actors competitors for the good in 
question. Rittberger and Zürn (1990: 31-32) further differentiate conflicts of interest 
according to the nature of the contentious goods. They distinguish between absolutely 
assessed goods like clean air or an intact ozone layer (where actors tend to consider only their 
own shares and gains in these goods; in short: ‘How much do I get?’) and relatively assessed 
goods such as fisheries or plant genetic resources (where relative shares and gains matter: 
‘How much more or less than the others do I get?’) (cf. Efinger, Rittberger and Zürn 1988). 
This said, hardly any issue area is marked by only one type of conflict. Instead, for an 
appropriate characterization of a subject matter according to problem-structural theory, one 
should go through all four types of conflict and identify potential aspects that fall under each 
of them. This ideally leads to just one type of conflict being more at the core of the issue area 
than others. But even if two types of conflict are equally prevailing, this may still allow for a 




Based on the fourfold typology of objects of contention, the Tübingen scholars expect 
different degrees of regime-conduciveness for each type. They assume that actors will more 
easily cooperate in conflicts over means and absolutely assessed goods, as these situations 
imply a less asymmetrical constellation of preferences. Their rating of regime-conduciveness 
reads – from high to low: conflicts over absolutely assessed goods, conflicts over means, 
conflicts over relatively assessed goods, conflicts over values (see Figure 1). 
Underdal subsumed these four types into his core distinction between benign and malign 
problems. He understands the political malignancy of a problem as “a function of the 
configuration of actor interests and preferences that it generates” (Underdal 2002: 15). In 





Figure 1. Objects of Contention and their Regime-Conduciveness 
means 




relatively assessed goods 
absolutely assessed goods 
(Sources: Efinger, Rittberger and Zürn 1988: 92; Rittberger and Zürn 1990: 29) 
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approaches, holding that certain constellations of preferences correspond to certain types of 
contested objects: 
- Malign problems are characterized by their incongruity (i.e. the relationship of 
competition among actors) and their asymmetry (i.e. the incompatibility of values or 
negative correlation of interests across parties). More precisely, Underdal (2002: 21) 
names the following characteristics of incongruity problems:  
- Essence of problem = distortion of incentives; 
- risky consequences of unilateral cooperative moves; 
- likely manipulation or coercion in the course of negotiations; and  
- persisting incentives for unilateral defection even after an agreement could be 
struck.  
In light of these features, the notion of malign problems incorporates the types of conflicts 
over values and conflicts over relatively assessed goods (problem-structural approach) as 
well as collaboration and suasion situations (situation-structural approach).  
- Benign problems in turn are characterized by: 
- Essence of problem = imperfect information or communication failure; 
- no risky consequences of unilateral cooperative moves (apart from transaction 
costs of own efforts); 
- integrative negotiations; and 
- no incentives for unilateral defection from an agreed solution. 
By stressing symmetrical interests and values, the type of benign conflicts covers Rittberger’s 
and Zürn’s conflicts over means and conflicts over absolutely assessed goods. Furthermore, 
with their relatively high potential for efficient cooperation, benign conflicts comprise major 
elements of the situation-structural types of assurance and coordination situations (Underdal 
2002).1 
Following this line of thought, we derive a first set of hypotheses, which will guide our 
explorative analysis of the three selected cases (and which could be tested in-depth in follow-
up studies): 
I. Benign problems tend to feature a centrality of a (near-universal) public institution 
that takes over the key functions for regulating the issue area (e.g. overarching 
decision-making and core funding). They will leave less functional space for private 
institutions and rely on delegated authority.  
Malign problems tend to feature multiple or no public institutional cores. The 
resulting space and governance gaps call for other types of institutions (smaller public 
ones, private ones) to fill the significant governance gaps through entrepreneurial 
authority.  
These hypotheses help us mostly to predict the first dimension of public centrality, and also 
tendencies towards sources of private authority (delegated or entrepreneurial), but they do not 
give us more than a tendency about the particular functions that are taken over by private 
                                                
1	  Still,	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  qualify	  a	  governance	  problem	  with	  certainty	  as	  benign	  or	  malign	  according	  to	  the	  
above	  characteristics,	  since	  at	  least	  some	  of	  them	  leave	  room	  for	  interpretation.	  Ultimately	  then,	  a	  thorough	  
analysis	   should	   assess	   whether	   relevant	   actors	   perceive	   a	   problem	   as,	   for	   instance,	   implying	   risky	  
consequences	  or	  manipulated	  negotiations	  (cf.	  Hajer	  1993;	  Schmidt	  2008;	  Wagenaar	  2011).	  Such	  a	  perception-­‐
based	  approach	  also	  puts	  higher	  demands	  on	  the	  research	  process.	  For	  our	  own	  explorative	  illustration	  in	  this	  




authority institutions. For a more specific explanation, the literature on private authority 
provides us with a helpful approach that goes beyond the mere nature of an issue area in 
question – but is nonetheless related to it.  
Green (2014: 40-52) names both the demand for private authority (by the governed) and the 
supply of private authority as main explanatory factors for its emergence – and for the 
performance of particular functions. Adapting Green’s distinctions for supply and demand 
sides, we introduce two further sets of hypotheses to explain the functional mix in complex 
governance architectures. 
II. Private authority institutions tend to perform specific functions when there is a 
demand of the governed for: 
- lowering transaction costs: through orchestrating, knowledge brokering, soft rule / 
standard-setting, and financing; 
- enhancing credibility of commitments: through knowledge brokering and 
evaluating; 
- providing first mover advantage on a policy problem, i.e. allowing those actors 
moving first to set expectations for the outcome: through soft rule / standard-
setting and implementing,  
- enhancing reputation: through soft rule / standard-setting and implementing. 
Private authority institutions tend to perform specific functions when they provide a 
supply of: 
- expert opinions: for knowledge brokering and evaluating; 
- political experience; legal or moral authority: for orchestrating, soft rule / standard 
setting and implementing; 
- financial capacities and economic experience: for financing and trading. 
Unlike the first two sets of assumptions, these hypotheses cover relatively short causal 
chains, with the dependent variable (distribution of functions among private and public 
institutions) explained by functional gaps (demand side) and functional qualities (supply 
side). In other words: while problem structure provides us with a more fundamental scope 
condition, supply and demand are of more immediate causal character.  
What is more, demand and supply can – certainly not only, but partly – be seen as a function 
of the nature of the problem to be regulated. As assumption I above states, certain governance 
gaps may go back a malign problem structure. And the different demands that Green 
identifies partly correspond with specific governance gaps – jurisdictional, cognitive / 
operational, incentive-related – that have been identified in the literature on international 
regimes (Brühl 2003). In the same vein, Green makes clear that private institutions will only 
be chosen to perform these functions “when IOs cannot supply the equivalent benefits” (ibid.: 
47) – in other words, when significant public governance gaps occur. 
Bearing this qualification in mind, the factors of demand and supply rather play the role of 
intervening variables in our analytical framework that are, at least in part, influenced by the 
problem structure – apart from, certainly, various other rival explanations that would need to 
be controlled for, e.g. knowledge or power structures (see Figure 2 for an overview of the 
analytical framework). 
Finally, as in any scientifically realist research design that seeks, there are rival factors that 
may also influence the shape of an institutional architecture, or that may already have an 
impact on supply of and demand for private authority. Jordan et al. (2015, p. 979) summarize 
some of these factors currently debated in the literature on transnational governance: “most 
scholars are still identifying potential sub-categories of motivation, including moral concerns, 
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fear of new regulation (or the opportunity to secure first-mover advantages by shaping it), the 
pursuit of direct financial rewards, indirect or ‘non-climate’ benefits (for example, 
reputational enhancement), and the satisfaction of consumer expectations.”  
To probe this framework for the three cases in question, we will have to suffice with a legal 
and institutional qualitative analysis for each case, and an explorative comparison across 
cases along the criteria mentioned above. The scope of this paper and the current state of our 
research does not allow for a more in-depth study. In addition, the relative novelty of all three 
issue areas sets limits to our period of observation. Problem structures are not fixed, but may 
change over time, depending on shifts in values or interests. Such changes may not be visible 
yet in the short period of institutionalization that the three issue areas have undergone. So for 
practical matters we will analyse the current ‘snapshots’ of all three architectures.  
 
Our limited application of the above framework for all three cases is as follows:  
- We will assess the benignancy or malignancy of each problem structure, asking to 
what extent it carries elements of each type of consensual and dissensual conflict 
listed above. We will not rely on the perceptions of key actors, but instead build 
this assessment on our own preliminary deductions and the major literatures on 
the issue in question. 
- We will assess the supply and demand structures for private authority in the same 
way, again relying on deduction and secondary literature instead of a bottom-up 
and in-depth research process.   
- We will describe the dependent variable in terms of the factors listed in Table 1 
above – with emphasis on centrality and functional distribution among key 
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institutions, while identifying sources of authority would demand a more thorough 
analysis.  
 
3 The Institutional Complexity of REDD Governance 
 
REDD: Incentives and many open questions 
REDD (‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation’) is one of the 
major elements in a series of incentive-based mechanisms for environmental governance that 
have been developed in the last 15 to 20 years (Bernstein 2002). Proponents of REDD seek to 
provide significant economic incentives for the sustainable use and conservation of forests 
while also reducing the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation.  
However, the heated international debate about REDD in climate negotiations and other 
arenas leaves open questions about REDD’s social, economic and environmental 
consequences. At the time of writing, a number of key aspects still need to be specified and 
clarified, including inter alia: what constitutes adequate safeguarding; how countries will be 
held accountable for achieving it; what are overarching conditions for the allocation of funds; 
which approaches to measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) should be prioritized. 
Despite this inconclusiveness and uncertainty, a large number of developing countries, 
including those with the world’s largest shares of tropical forests, have begun to create 
institutional and programmatic infrastructures based on REDD. The global REDD 
architecture is only gradually taking shape at UNFCCC meetings, while at same time, a series 
of international REDD (funding) initiatives emerged outside of the UNFCCC umbrella. 
These national and international approaches coincide with a variety of processes that 
stakeholders have initiated at the regional and local levels, including different arenas of self-
organization and a growing number of very diverse pilot projects (Wertz-Kanounnikoff / 
Angelsen 2008).. Altogether, these endeavours have created an intricate patchwork of multi-
level governance with diverse top-down and bottom-up processes and institutions operating 
in parallel.  
 
REDD in international climate negotiations 
The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio led to the creation of important global environmental 
governance institutions. Apart from the UNFCCC, two other initiatives that more directly 
focus on forest protection were established after the summit: the legally binding Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD), which entered into force in 1993, and the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Forests, which was succeeded in 2000 by the United Nations Forum on Forests 
(UNFF) (Scholz 2004).  
While the UNFCCC negotiations predominantly address afforestation or deforestation with 
regard to biomass and carbon stocks, the UNFF and the CBD address the sustainable use of 
forests and forest protection to conserve biodiversity. Since their inception, these two 
institutions have not attained their goals of reducing or avoiding deforestation and 
biodiversity loss in absolute terms. Nevertheless, the two institutions remain the chief global 
forums on forest protection – with sometimes tense relations with the UNFCCC (Kim 2004; 
Rosendal 2001). 
Apart from exchanges of information, UNFCCC and CBD have not achieved a stronger 
cross-institutional coordination of their activities on deforestation, notwithstanding the 
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establishment of an Ad-hoc Technical Expert Group under the CBD (AHTEG). Pistorius and 
Schmitt (2013) find that both institutions could benefit from more synergetic exchanges 
following their poor collaboration on REDD. This particularly applies to CBD decisions to 
provide voluntary guidance for REDD countries, along with criteria and indicators that could 
be used for national safeguard information systems (SIS).  
During and after the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the UNFCCC increasingly 
referred to the role of forests. The Protocol’s list of policies and measures for helping parties 
to meet their emission reduction commitments include the “protection and enhancement of 
sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases” and more specifically, the “promotion of 
sustainable forest management practices, afforestation and reforestation” (Art. 2.1.a.ii). 
Before the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP) in December 2007, forests and other types of 
biomass were mostly treated in GHG inventories for calculating the emission reduction 
targets of industrialized countries that were set by the Kyoto Protocol. 
Only the alarming rates of global deforestation have made the international community 
recognize the central role that tropical forests play in mitigating climate change. In 2005, a 
group of developing countries rich in tropical forests, led by Costa Rica and Papua New 
Guinea, proposed REDD at international climate negotiations. Two years later, COP 13 
delegates decided to develop a framework to compensate developing countries for protecting 
their forests. A COP decision noted that deforestation and forest degradation contribute to 
climate change and affirmed “the urgent need to take further meaningful action to reduce 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation”.2 Parties further admitted that reducing 
deforestation-related emissions requires stable financial resources. 
At COP 15 in Copenhagen in December 2009, REDD was identified as a key instrument for 
preventing dangerous climate change. However, the failure of the Copenhagen summit to 
produce a successor to the Kyoto Protocol postponed an initial agreement on REDD. To 
circumvent the UNFCCC deadlock and maintain momentum, representatives of 55 countries 
met in Oslo in May 2010 to found the REDD+ Partnership. They pledged a total of USD 4 
billion in fast-start financing for REDD measures in the period from 2010 to 2012. The 
partnership eventually grew to 76 member countries by the time of its final meeting in late 
2014.  
The fruits of Oslo provided new impetus for holding REDD discussions under the UNFCCC 
umbrella. At COP 16 in Cancún in December 2010, parties finally managed to adopt a first 
agreement on REDD, which was regarded as a major breakthrough by delegates, NGOs and 
scholarly observers (IISD 2010; CIFOR 2010). The Cancún Agreement invites developing 
countries to prepare national REDD action plans, establish national reference levels or, as 
interim solutions, sub-national reference levels. Industrialized countries, on the other hand, 
are requested to support REDD through multilateral and bilateral channels. In other words, 
unlike the Kyoto Protocol’s project-level Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), REDD 
was established as a voluntary, national government-driven mechanism to mitigate concerns 
about leakage and accounting. The ‘+’ was added to REDD to reflect the inclusion of forest 
conservation and management and carbon stock enhancement (McDermott et al. 2012, 120). 
Appendix I of the Cancún Agreement also included a list of social and environmental 
safeguards to be respected when implementing REDD activities. In addition to poverty 
alleviation and the conservation of biodiversity, the safeguards refer to aspects of social 
inclusion and good governance, such as the consistency of participation and transparency, as 
well as indigenous and local rights. Concrete references to monitoring practices like remote 




sensing or on-site inventories, however, were not included. While the 2011 Durban 
Agreement further elaborated the potential shape and content of national safeguard 
information systems, there was no progress at COP 18 in Doha in November 2012, leaving 
“unclear what constitutes adequate safeguarding or how countries will be held accountable 
for achieving it” (ibid.; see also Pistorius / Schmitt 2013). 
In November 2013, COP 19 sought to partly close this gap by adopting a set of decisions 
under the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, backed by combined pledges of USD 280 million 
from the United States, United Kingdom and Norway. According to the framework, to be 
eligible for performance-based financing, governments must provide a summary every two 
years about how they are complying with the REDD safeguards agreed in Cancún. Country 
delegates also agreed to define drivers of deforestation, devise systems for measurement, 
reporting and verification (MRV), and establish baseline reference levels (Dechert 2014). 
However, the framework’s vague phrasing leaves various loopholes. Complying with the 
safeguards or reporting on how they are being respected is not compulsory, and least 
developed countries can technically choose if and when they will even provide a summary. 
Likewise, preferences or guidelines for certain types of MRV systems were missing. 
At COP 20 in Lima in December 2014, countries tried to concretize some of these aspects for 
the design of SIS. They also discussed a more holistic approach combining mitigation and 
adaptation measures for sustainable forest management. However, both of these REDD-
related talks at Lima ended without specific results.3  
 
Beyond the UNFCCC: Major partnerships and funding institutions 
Against the backdrop of inconclusive UN climate negotiations, a series of other institutions 
have addressed REDD and MRV-related issues outside the umbrella of the UNFCCC (cf. 
Corbera / Schroeder 2011; Thompson et al. 2011). Given REDD’s incentive-based nature, 
financing initiatives are central. This includes established financial mechanisms like the 
Global Environment Facility, and regional banks that administer their own funding 
mechanisms such as the Amazon Fund or the Congo Basin Forest Fund. In addition, three 
major multilateral REDD funding initiatives have been created: the Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF) of the World Bank, launched at the UNFCCC–COP 13 in 2007; 
the Forest Investment Programme (FIP); and UN–REDD (United Nations Collaborative 
Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) Programme. 
In 2008 the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) launched UN–REDD, the first institution to conduct nationwide programmes. UN–
REDD supports readiness activities and supports governance, stakeholder participation and 
local capacity development, such as for MRV. In 2010, Indonesia, Tanzania and Vietnam had 
already completed their National Joint Programmes and started their first REDD initiatives. 
By January 2015, a total of USD 217.7 million had been deposited by contributing countries 
for programmes in partner countries. The major share of this money, USD 183.5 million, 
came from Norway alone.4 
At the time of writing, the FCPF was facilitating cooperation between donors and the 
governments of 36 developing countries, and funding the preparations for national REDD 
strategies through ‘Readiness Proposals’. The facility “serves the dual goal of building 
                                                
3  http://www.redd-monitor.org/2014/12/09/what-came-out-of-lima-cop20-on-redd-part-1-reddlock/, 
accessed 29/01/2015. 
4  http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/un-redd-programme, accessed 29/01/2015. 
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capacity for implementing REDD+ in developing countries through the establishment of 
national monitoring systems, management systems and stakeholder consultation 
arrangements (through its Readiness Fund), and testing the feasibility of performance-based 
payments through pilot activities (through its Carbon Fund)” (McDermott et al. 2012,122). A 
total of USD 280.6 million had been deposited for the facility by January 2015, nearly half of 
this, USD 129.3 million, by the German government.5 
Several regional developing banks, including the Inter-American Development Bank, and a 
few bilateral donors created the Forest Investment Programme (FIP), a multi-trust fund in 
the World Bank’s Strategic Climate Fund. The FIP seeks to support capacity development 
and measures for implementing REDD. As of January 2015, the programme had received 
pledges of USD 530 million, all of which have been deposited, Norway (USD 142 million) 
and the UK (USD 162 million) being the major contributors.6  
Next to these multilateral bodies, a series of bilateral activities (by Norway, Germany, and 
Japan in particular) contribute significantly to REDD financing. Voluntary carbon markets 
also provide funding for REDD pilot projects (Hamilton / Chokkalingam / Bendana 2010; 
Intergovernmental Taskforce 2010). But while such markets raised about USD 700 million in 
2008, only a fraction of this sum was associated with REDD projects. However, other 
market-based approaches, and careful linking of domestic and sub-national markets, could 
considerably boost these figures in the next years. One example is the Governors’ Climate 
and Forests Task Force (GCF) that included 19 states and provinces in seven different 
countries in September 2013. The GCF seeks to link REDD activities in various countries 
with tropical forests to climate change legislation in California, “thereby paving the way for a 
regulated REDD+ carbon market” (McDermott et al. 2012, 122). 
The picture becomes even more complicated when other institutions and treaties that relate 
to it REDD but do not primarily focus on it are taken into account. A full depiction of the 
broader institutional embeddedness is beyond the scope of this article. But two examples for 
bilateral treaties, both for the case of Peru, quickly illustrate the importance of such 
agreements: The country’s bilateral trade agreements with both the European Union (EU) and 
China explicitly mention links between forests and climate change, and a direct reference is 
made to REDD in the EU–Peru agreement. This practice of including environmental 
concerns in commercial agreements can have mixed implications, such as facilitating general 
environmental safeguards or further commodifying environmental goods and services 
(Bernstein 2002). 
The proliferation of institutions has created a very complex governance architecture for 
REDD (cf. Gupta et al. 2013). This complexity poses challenges to governmental and non-
governmental actors who try to follow the debates, decisions and opportunities. Institutional 
complexity – combined with institutional overlaps at the domestic and sub-domestic levels – 
overwhelms actors with less-developed organizational or financial capacities who can barely 
follow the various discussions.  
The institutional complexity also raises questions of duplication and coordination deficits, 
including for safeguards and allocation mechanisms (cf. Pistorius / Schmitt 2013; Pokorny et 
al. 2013; Savaresi 2013). A first attempt to address this complexity and to enhance cross-
institutional coherence on MRV and related questions has failed. The REDD+ partnership 
aimed to be transformed into a UNFCCC mechanism that can play a strong coordinative role. 
                                                
5  http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/forest-carbon-partnership-facility, accessed 29/01/2015  
6 http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/forest-investment-program, accessed 29/01/2015. 
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However, this institutional step was never accomplished and the partnership instead held its 
final meeting in Lima in November 2014. 
Notwithstanding such challenges, the REDD financing architecture also creates more 
opportunities for countries to seek funding from various sources for different phases 
(preparation, implementation and results-based actions). Table 2 illustrates how, for instance, 




Table 2. Different funding sources of REDD in Peru (authors; based on: Che Piu and Menton 
2013, 54). 
Source	   Document	  or	  Project	   Phase	   Volume	  in	  
US$	  
millions	  
FCPF	   R-­‐PP	  (approved	  in	  2011)	   REDD+	  preparation	  phase	   3.8	  





UN-­‐REDD Strengthening	  capacities	  of	  Indigenous	  
People	  for	  their	  informed	  participation	  in	  
the	  design	  and	  implementation	  of	  the	  
REDD+	  mechanism	  in	  Peru 
REDD+	  preparation	  phase 0.155 
FAO-­‐Finland	   Project	  on	  a	  national	  forest	  inventory	  and	  
sustainable	  forest	  management	  
REDD+	  preparation	  phase	   4	  
Germany	   Project	  on	  support	  for	  REDD	  
implementation	  in	  Peru	  (initiated	  in	  2012)	  
REDD+	  preparation	  phase	   7.1	  
Norway,	  
Germany	  







Japan	   Support	  for	  PNCB	   Support	  for	  forest	  
conservation	  
50	  
Gordon	  and	  Betty	  
Moore	  
Foundation	  
Project	  on	  technical,	  scientific	  and	  
institutional	  capacity	  development	  for	  
REDD	  implementation	  
REDD+	  preparation	  phase	   1.9	  
 
 
4 The Institutional Complexity of SLCP Governance 
 
SLCPs: Sources, impacts and abatement 
 
As their name suggests, short-lived climate pollutants have in common that, in comparison 
with gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2), they have a shorter atmospheric lifetime. This, in 
turn, suggests that the climate response following emission reductions will be faster. 
Although SLCPs are commonly discussed as a group, it is useful to draw out their individual 
characteristics, in terms of their sources, their impacts (both on climate change mitigation as 
well as other impacts), and the abatement options. 
Black carbon (or soot) is not a greenhouse gas, but it is an important driver of global 
warming: it absorbs sunlight and generates heat; it reduces the ability of snow and ice to 
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reflect sunlight; and it affects cloud formations. Black carbon only stays in the atmosphere 
for a few days. Although black carbon emissions in the past originated from Western Europe 
and North America in the past, they have increasingly shifted to developing countries, with 
~25 to 35% of emissions stemming from China and India alone (Ramanathan and Carmichael 
2008). But also in other regions, including South East Asia, Latin America and equatorial 
Africa black carbon emissions are on the rise. 
Reducing black carbon emissions would bring about near-term climate benefits, with Shindell 
et al. (2012) estimating that a mix of technical and regulatory measures would lead to 0.19°C 
of avoided warming by 2050. In addition, addressing black carbon can help avoid regional 
warming, notably in the Arctic and the Himalayan Plateau. The longer-term climate benefits 
of black carbon are less straightforward, with recent studies suggesting that the effects of 
black carbon measures in the long term may be negligible. Such findings heavily depend on 
assumptions about the action taken on CO2: since black carbon is often a result of the same 
processes that lead to CO2 emissions, measures addressing the latter will limit the effect of 
black carbon measures (Bowerman et al. 2013; Rogelj et al. 2014). 
In addition to climate benefits, reducing black carbon is expected to lead to other benefits, 
especially for human health and food security. For instance, UNEP and WMO (2011, 193) 
estimate that measures to address black carbon “could avoid 2.4 million premature deaths 
(within a range of 0.7–4.6 million)”. Moreover, such measures would also lead to significant 
benefits in terms of agricultural productivity, with Shindell et al. (2012) estimating that a 
small set of technical measures can already lead to enhanced crop yields of several millions 
of tons. 
Another SLCP, methane, is also a potent greenhouse gas, with a global warming potential 34 
times that of CO2 (Myrhe et al. 2013, 714) and an atmospheric lifetime of about 9.1 years. In 
addition to its natural causes (notably emissions from wetlands), anthropogenic methane 
emissions are generated by a variety of activities, such as fossil fuel (coal, oil and natural gas) 
production, distribution and consumption, agricultural activities such as livestock breeding 
and rice production, landfills and – to a smaller extent – wastewater treatment (UNEP and 
WMO 2011, 44-45). 
Methane emissions are also responsible for another SLCP, tropospheric ozone (not to be 
confused with stratospheric ozone, which helps prevent dangerous ultraviolet radiation, and 
which can be found at higher altitudes in the atmosphere). Unlike other SLCPs, tropospheric 
ozone is not directly emitted, but is created through a chemical reaction involving sunlight 
and precursors which, in addition to methane, include nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide and 
other non-methane volatile organic compounds. Reducing methane will also help reduce 
tropospheric ozone, as it is responsible for about two-thirds of tropospheric ozone production 
(UNEP and WMO, 59). 
The near-term climate benefits of addressing methane are significant, with measures to 
reduce methane emissions estimated to lead to avoided warming of about 0.28°C by 2050 
(Shindell et al. 2012). Although also the longer-term climate benefits of methane emission 
reductions will depend on action on CO2, methane mitigation strategies are also considered to 
be essential for staying below a 2°C temperature rise above pre-industrial levels in the long 
run (Rogelj et al. 2014). 
The non-climate benefits of methane mitigation materialize largely through its indirect 
impact on tropospheric ozone. Also here the impacts can be measured both in terms of human 
health and agricultural productivity (Shindell et al. 2012).  
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Finally, HFCs are chemicals that are used as a substitute for ozone-depleting substances. 
While they are used in only a limited set of products, their use is rising (see Figure 2). This is 
all the more important, since the global warming potential of some HFCs outstrips that of 
CO2 significantly, sometimes by several thousands (Xu et al. 2013). 
 
 
Figure 3. HFC sources and consumption over time. (Source: UNEP 2011b, 16). 
 
 
Given the high warming contribution of rising HFC emissions, measures to abate them hold 
significant potential to avoid warming in the near- and long-term. Table 3 offers a 
summarizing overview of the main features of the various SLCPs. 
 
Table 3. Characteristics of SLCPs. 
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Mapping the institutional complexity for SLCPs 
 
This section offers a short, non-exhaustive overview of the main international institutions 
governing SLCPs to date, outlining some of the main actions taken to date. Table 4 gives an 
initial overview of the institutions discussed below. 
 
Table 4. Institutions governing SLCPs. 
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The potential role of the Montreal Protocol in reducing HFCs has received much attention in 
recent years. The use of HFCs has grown rapidly following their adoption as a substitute for 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), an ozone-depleting substance and hydrochlorofluorocarbons 
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(HCFCs), itself a transitional chemical that helps with phasing out CFCs. Depending on the 
growth projections used, HFCs could contribute to annual greenhouse gas emissions between 
3.5-8.8 Gt CO2-eq. by 2050 (UNEP 2011a, p. 22). While HFCs are powerful greenhouse 
gases, they do not contribute to ozone depletion, meaning that they are not regulated by the 
Montreal Protocol. As greenhouse gases, HFCs fall within the purview of the UNFCCC, and 
they are explicitly listed in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol; however, specific measures to 
address them have not been adopted in the climate regime. 
Since 2009, Micronesia, Canada, Mexico and the United States have proposed amendments 
to the Montreal Protocol to address this gap. These proposals have gained significant traction 
through the 2011 Bali Declaration (signed by 112 countries), a reference in the Rio+20 
outcome document, a statement of intent at the 2013 G20 meeting, and bilateral talks between 
the US and China and India in the same year. For some parties, however, there remain 
concerns about the availability and the costs of alternatives for HFCs in different sectors. 
Nevertheless, the signals coming out of the November 2014 meeting of the parties to the 
Montreal Protocol have been positive, signalling a broader consensus that agreement on a 
HFCs phase out under the treaty may be within reach. 
The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) is a regional 
agreement adopted under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE). Initially established to tackle the acid rain problem, it has grown to cover a variety 
of local and regional air pollutants through its eight protocols. The Convention and its 
protocols provide for national emission ceilings, and have put in place an extensive 
monitoring system. The Convention has 51 parties hailing from the EU, Eurasia (including 
Russia) and North America (the US and Canada). 
Some of the Convention’s protocols target SLCPs. The 1988 Sofia Protocol on nitrogen oxide 
and the 1991 Geneva Protocol on volatile organic compounds, for example, aim at reducing 
emissions of substances that are precursors of tropospheric ozone. More importantly, the 
LRTAP has made significant developments in the regulation of black carbon emissions. In 
2009, an Ad Hoc Expert Group on Black Carbon was created under the 1999 Gothenburg 
Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone to examine the 
options for addressing black carbon. The report of the Expert Group in 2010, stressing the 
health and climate benefits of tackling black carbon, indicated that additional measures in a 
variety of sectors in the UNECE region up to 2020 could reduce black carbon emissions by 
40% (UNECE 2010), and suggested amending the Gothenburg Protocol to include black 
carbon. In May 2012, the 25 Parties to the Protocol (which include the EU, the US and 
Canada) agreed on a set of amendments. As a first step, a guidance document to assist Parties 
in identifying control techniques for black carbon emissions was developed in 2012 (UNECE 
2012). This was followed by guidelines for reporting on emissions under the Gothenburg 
Protocol that also apply to black carbon emissions. This will facilitate the development of 
black carbon emission inventories at the national level (UNECE 2013). 
The Kyoto Protocol suggests that the regulation of emissions from international shipping 
should be dealt with in the context of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). A 
wide range of treaties has been adopted under the auspices of the IMO, including the 
1973/1978 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 
Convention). Although the Convention initially did not cover air pollution, a new Annex VI 
was agreed in 1997 to cover a range of air pollutants.7 Although these pollutants did not 
                                                
7 Annex VI has 75 Parties, representing almost 95% of world shipping tonnage. See Summary Status of 
Conventions, at http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx. 
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include greenhouse gases, a resolution was adopted in the same year to study shipping 
emissions and consider mitigation strategies.8  
The IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) is the primary body 
responsible for matters relating to environmental pollution from ships. In 2010, Norway, 
Sweden and the United States proposed to discuss black carbon emission reductions from 
shipping in the Arctic (IMO 2010). This proposal launched discussions which currently take 
place under the MEPC’s sub-committee on Pollution Prevention and Response, focusing 
specifically on: (i) the definition of black carbon; (ii) measurement methods; and (iii) 
possible control measures. As of 2014, the sub-committee had not yet reached agreement on a 
definition (although it had narrowed down to two options), thereby also stalling agreement on 
measurement methods and control measures. 
In 2013, several NGOs suggested to include provisions on black carbon in an International 
Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (the ‘Polar Code’), which was under discussion in 
the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (IMO 2013). While the mandatory Polar Code was 
adopted in November 2014 and includes environmental provisions, the MEPC decided to 
await the outcomes of its own sub-committee first, meaning that the Code does not address 
black carbon. 
Various studies highlight the specific impacts of SLCPs on the Arctic (e.g. UNEP 2011a; 
World Bank and ICCI 2013). SLCPs have become an emerging issue for the Arctic Council, 
a high-level forum bringing together eight Arctic states. Although the Council was set up to 
discuss various Arctic issues, it has had a strong focus on environmental issues. 
In 2009 a Task Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers was established, with an initial focus 
on black carbon. It produced a report in 2011, recommending the Arctic Council to take a 
leadership role by sharing information about black carbon emissions and adopting measures 
for various emitting sectors (e.g. transportation; residential heating) (Arctic Council 2011a). 
The Council’s 2011 Nuuk Declaration encouraged the Arctic states to implement its 
recommendations to reduce black carbon emissions (Arctic Council 2011b). The Task 
Force’s scope broadened to include methane, with a subsequent report suggesting that 
significant methane mitigation options were feasible, and recommending the Arctic states to 
develop and share black carbon inventories (Arctic Council 2013a). The latter 
recommendation was embraced in the 2013 Kiruna Declaration.9 Moreover, the declaration 
established a new Task Force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane to develop 
arrangements for these SLCPs (Arctic Council 2013b). This task force coordinates with the 
Council’s Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), which is simultaneously 
carrying out scientific assessments on black carbon, methane and tropospheric ozone. 
The emerging understanding of the benefits of rapid action on SLCPs led several countries 
(Bangladesh, Canada, Ghana, Mexico, Sweden and the US) to launch the Climate and Clean 
Air Coalition (CCAC) in 2012. The Coalition’s aims are to raise awareness on SLCPs, 
enhance and develop actions at the national and regional level, promote best practices, 
improve scientific understanding on SLCPs, and mobilize resources for actions. 




9 In a separate meeting of Arctic Council environment ministers, it was agreed to submit these inventories under 




The CCAC is a non-legally binding, government-led, public-private partnership. To date, 44 
countries (as well as the European Commission) have joined the Coalition, including both 
developed and developing countries (although major economies such as Brazil, China, India 
and South Africa are not partners). The Coalition is administered by UNEP, and provides for 
the active participation of non-governmental organizations, including international 
organizations (e.g. the World Health Organization, the United Nations Development 
Programme and the World Bank), environmental and scientific organizations, and the private 
sector. 
The CCAC encourages actions by the partners through initiatives focused on: (1) heavy-duty 
diesel vehicles; (2) brick production; (3) the municipal solid waste sector; (4) promoting HFC 
alternatives; (5) methane and black carbon emissions from oil and natural gas production; (6) 
agriculture; and (7) household cooking and domestic heating. In addition, three crosscutting 
initiatives have been established for financing, national planning, and regional assessments. 
The initiatives generally focus on specific SLCPs in targeted sectors. While it does not act as 
a funding platform, a Trust Fund has been established through which specific programs 
decided by the Coalition can be funded. By the end of 2013, about US$46 million was 
pledged for 2012-2015 (CCAC 2013). 
The Global Methane Initiative evolved from an earlier public-private partnership, Methane 
to Markets, which was launched in 2004. The initiative has been joined by 42 countries from 
the developed and developing world, as well as the European Commission. The GMI aims to 
reduce methane emissions, enhance methane recovery, and use methane as a clean energy 
resource. The initiative is country-driven, with its Steering Committee consisting of country 
representatives. Through the GMI, partner countries voluntarily commit to developing 
improved emissions estimates; promoting public-private collaboration on methane emission 
reductions, recovery or use; identifying and address barriers to investments; and developing 
and implementing action plans with concrete activities. In addition to the partner countries, 
over 1300 non-state actors – including the private sector and NGOs – participate through a 
‘Project Network’. 
The GMI’s activities are organized along various methane-emitting sectors, including 
agriculture, coal mines, municipal solid waste, oil and gas, and wastewater, with sub-
committees established for each of these areas. The US has played a major role in starting 
and continuing the initiative, with the country contributing roughly $74.4 million between 
2005-2012 (US EPA 2013). This role is reflected by the fact that the US Environmental 
Protection Agency chairs its Steering Committee and actively participates in several sub-
committees. 
The overview thus far shows that there is much institutional activity outside of the UNFCCC 
on SLCPs. Yet this does not mean that the UNFCCC plays no part at all. Methane and HFCs 
act as greenhouse gases, and are therefore implicitly covered by the UNFCCC;10 moreover, 
they are explicitly mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol’s basket of greenhouse gases. Although 
the Protocol’s basket approach – as opposed to a gas-by-gas approach – has deflected 
attention away from these gases, with most parties’ focus being firmly on CO2 (Gillespie 
2003), basic obligations apply to all greenhouse gases, such as their reporting in national 
inventories and national communications (and measures to abate them). For instance, Annex I 
parties have to present disaggregated data on HFC and methane emissions in their annual 
inventories (IPCC 1999). In other words, reporting on these SLCPs under the climate regime 
is by now a well-established practice. 
                                                
10 Tropospheric ozone is also a greenhouse gas; however, it is not directly emitted into the air, but rather created 
through chemical reactions. 
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The UNFCCC does not include all methane emissions, however, as some emissions – e.g., 
resulting from the thawing of permafrost – are due to natural activities, and parties’ reporting 
obligations are limited to anthropogenic activities. Nonetheless, parties could still raise issues 
related to methane emissions reporting under the Convention (Wold et al. 2014). 
In addition to reporting, activities to reduce emissions from methane and HFCs have been 
triggered through the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The 
mechanism’s use for reducing HFC emissions was heavily criticized, as implementing HFC 
projects (specifically, projects to destroy HFC-23) became a profitable activity, meaning that 
credits emerging from these projects flooded the international carbon market.11 Following a 
ban by the EU of these credits in 2013, demand for HFC credits dropped significantly. 
Although concrete options to address either HFCs or methane under the UNFCCC remain to 
be agreed, discussions continue both in the pre-2020 and the post-2020 context.12 
 
Disentangling the web: Distinguishing individual SLCPs 
The overview thus far shows that there is no lack of institutional activity on SLCPs. Indeed, it 
shows that states and non-state actors are actively pursuing options to address each SLCP in 
several forums. What also emerges from the discussion thus far is that, with the notable 
exception of the CCAC, SLCPs are rarely discussed together as a group. Some institutions 
focus only on one SLCP, such as black carbon (LRTAP Convention; IMO), HFCs (Montreal 
Protocol) or methane (GMI); some discuss black carbon and methane in conjunction (Arctic 
Council). These practices suggest that irrespective of their commonalities, governments 
approach SLCPs in a disaggregated fashion. Indeed, there may be valid reasons for this 
disaggregated approach, as also highlighted in the discussion of features of SLCPs above: 
 
• The sources of SLCPs vary, both geographically and in terms of sectors. This will 
make some institutions more relevant, depending on membership and sectoral 
coverage. For instance, as black carbon is emitted by shipping, the IMO has started 
discussions on control measures; yet such discussions are unlikely to also cover other 
SLCPs, such as methane and HFCs. 
• Tackling different SLCPs will lead to different non-climate mitigation benefits. This, 
in turn, may have implications for which international institutions are relevant. For 
instance, health and food security benefits has raised the interest of the World Health 
Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization, respectively. Yet such 
interest may not extend to other SLCPs, such as HFCs. 
 
The point here is not to suggest that SLCPs do not have many common characteristics and 
therefore can or should not be addressed in conjunction. However, understanding the unique 
features of each SLCP may help to better understand whether and how different international 
institutions can work in a mutually supportive way to address both SLCPs and CO2. 
 
 
                                                
11 The criticism aimed at HFC-23 projects was not limited to the volume of credits, but also concerned the 
perverse incentives provided by the CDM. There was evidence that project developers increased HCFC-22 
production (of which HFC-23 is a by-product) just to earn more credits from further HFC-23 destruction 
(Schneider 2011).  





5  The Institutional Complexity of Climate Engineering 
Governance 
 
Climate Engineering: Technologies and ethics 
Climate Engineering describes a range of technological approaches to intentionally alter the 
Earth’s atmosphere at a global scale, with the aim of reducing the impacts of global warming. 
It is generally subdivided into two distinct groups of technologies: Solar Radiation 
Management (SRM) and Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR).  
The general aim of SRM is to increase the amount of sunlight that is reflected from the Earth. 
It covers approaches such as placing mirrors into the Earth’s orbit (Seifritz, 1989), increasing 
marine cloud albedo (Latham, 2002), increasing the reflectivity of crops (Ridgwell, 
Singarayer, Hetherington, & Valdes, 2009) or urban areas (Akbari, Menon, & Rosenfeld, 
2009), modifying high-altitude ice (cirrus) clouds (Mitchell & Finnegan, 2009) and injecting 
reflective particles into the Earth’s atmosphere (Crutzen, 2006). Its advocates argue that SRM 
serves as fast and effective solution to avoid climate catastrophes or ‘tipping points’, such as 
the melting of the polar ice sheets. Opponents point out that SRM does not address other 
important effects of climate change such as ocean acidification; that the side effects of SRM 
(e.g. change of weather and rain patterns) could eventually be worse than the effects of global 
warming; and that SRM is an end-of-pipe solution par-excellence. Nevertheless, it is not 
generally advocated as ‘the’ solution to climate change, but rather as a way to gain time while 
other solutions that focus on reducing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (through systemic 
change in the production of energy, reformation of land use and CDR) are implemented.  
Meanwhile, the aim of CDR is to capture CO2 from the atmosphere through more or less 
artificial means, ranging from afforestation over enhancement of algae growth in the oceans 
(Smetacek & Naqvi, 2008), geological weathering (Schuiling & Krijgsman, 2006) to the 
capture of CO2 straight from the air using machines (Keith, Ha-Duong, & Stolaroff, 2005; 
Lackner et al., 2012). CDR is generally less controversial than SRM, and is seen as a 
necessary component of climate policy. While methods like afforestation and the restoration 
of natural carbon sinks are often not even thought of as climate engineering (although they 
technically are, if done at large scales), technologies such as Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS) and ocean enrichment strategies to promote algae growth are criticised for their 
unpredictable effects on geological and ecological systems. Moreover, it is argued that CDR 
is too slow to prevent imminent climate catastrophes such as the melting of the polar ice caps. 
Both sets of technologies have been questioned due to their ethical implications and the fact 
that they may distract from the more important strategy of reducing anthropogenic CO2 
emissions. 
The idea of using climate engineering technologies to address the problem of global warming 
is not particularly new. First suggestions to combat climate change by increasing the Earth’s 
albedo were published in a US government report in 1965 (President’s Science Advisory 
Committee, 1965), and ideas on capturing CO2 from the atmosphere and storing it in the 
oceans were developed in 1977 (Marchetti, 1977). The topic became something of a taboo 
during the first UNFCCC discussions and the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, and only 
received a reinvigoration of interest in 2006 when Nobel Prize winning atmospheric scientist 
Paul Crutzen published a seminal article on the possible use of stratospheric sulphur 
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injections to cool the planet (Crutzen, 2006). Since then, publications on climate engineering 
have soared exponentially (Linnér & Wibeck, 2015). In 2013, climate engineering strategies 
were mentioned for the first time in the IPCC’s fifth assessment report, constituting the final 
paragraph of working group one’s summary for policy makers (IPCC, 2013). 
Apart from technology-specific publications, the current debate around climate engineering 
focuses mainly on the question of whether or not to continue research and, if research is 
continued, how it should be governed. Linnér and Wibeck (2015) describe the technologies 
as ‘dual high-stake’, i.e. technologies involving high stakes in the case of implementation as 
well as in the case of non-implementation, which is why the discussion has more or less come 
to a stale mate. Advocates argue for more research on the technology and its effects, 
opponents argue for a moratorium, but both parties express the need for more research on the 
‘governance issue’. 
 
Sketching the institutional complexity for climate engineering 
Unlike for REDD and SLCPs, international public governance of climate engineering is 
considered more absent than present – at least, when it comes to an overarching governance 
institution on the issue. The 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD convention) is possibly 
the most appropriate existing agreement and broad enough to include climate engineering, 
but only prohibits ‘hostile use’ of environmental modification.  
However, depending on the type of climate engineering (e.g. CO2 removal; ocean iron 
fertilisation; solar radiation management), a range of institutions come into play, including, 
for instance, the Law of the Sea Convention and the Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) (Bodansky 2011). Yet the only international 
conventions that have actually been used to regulate climate engineering research (in the 
context of ocean iron fertilization) are the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention regarding 
marine pollution and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (Scott, 2013).  
Some government reports and academic articles have tried to develop options and proposals 
on how work with and improve existing legislation at the international level (Bodle & 
Oberthür, 2014; Bracmort & Lattanzio, 2013; Wirth, 2013). Others have analysed the 
probability of possible governance arrangements between states (Lloyd & Oppenheimer, 
2014; Ricke, Moreno-Cruz, & Caldeira, 2013). Still others argue that an international 
agreement on climate engineering will be just as complicated as an international agreement 
on climate change policy, which is why more focus should be placed on non-state actors and 
bottom-up development of norms in the process of research (Bellamy, 2014; Victor, 2008).  
In any case, the governance landscape of climate engineering has experienced some recent 
changes in the form of additional institutions aiming to explicitly address the issue of 
governance – not at an international level, but at a transnational level. These include three 
types of new institutions in particular. First, an increasing amount of research groups have 
evolved that are being funded to explicitly address the issue of governing climate 
engineering. Examples are the EuTRACE project and the Oxford Geoengineering 
Programme.  
Second, non-governmental initiatives have been launched to increase communication about 
climate engineering outside of academia, for instance, the Washington Geoengineering 
Consortium and the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative.  
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A third type of new institutions is also taking place in the form of agreements and codes of 
conduct amongst climate engineering scientists. An example here are the so-called ’Oxford 
Principles’, which were endorsed by the UK government and the gathering of geoengineering 
researchers at the Asilomar Conference on Climate Intervention Technologies. Such codes of 
conducts have also been introduced in in private companies that have attempted to engage in 
climate engineering technologies, e.g. the company Climos with its code of conduct for ocean 
fertilization.  
 
6 Conclusions and Outlook 
 
Assessing institutional complexity 
This paper could only provide a very preliminary overview of first results of the NAVIGOV 
project, namely with regard to the assessment of the degree of institutional complexity in the 
three issue areas. As these assessments have shown, the three issue areas coincide in various 
regards, e.g.: 
- The lack of an institutional core with an overarching mandate for the whole issue area; 
- Strong overlaps between environmental institutions of different domains (climate change, 
biodiversity and forestry for REDD; climate change, ozone, air pollution, maritime 
pollution for SLCPs; climate change, air pollution and biodiversity for climate 
engineering). 
On the other hands, some clear differences between the issue areas include: 
- The number of public international institutions involved (highly advanced for REDD; 
advanced for SLCPs; and low for climate engineering); 
- The level of institutional integration or division of labour evolving (many overlaps and 
duplications for REDD; a pollutant-based division of labour for SLCP; an unbalanced 
focus on research governance for climate engineering). 
Our next steps will be to systematize the comparison across issue areas, building on the 
criteria we established in section 2.1 for assessing institutional integration and the mix of 
public and private institutions in a governance architecture. We hope to come up with more 
informed observations that can also help us with the research question on causes of 
complexity – that is, asking how the different degrees of complexity mirror different types of 
causations. 
 
Explanations of institutional complexity 
Following the growing realization that international institutions do not operate in a vacuum, 
international relations scholars have provided insights on how international institutions 
interact within and across particular issue areas (Young 2002; Oberthür/Gehring 2006), how 
transnational actors and institutions add to this ‘complex multilateralism’ (Bäckstrand 2008) 
and how such interactions can be managed (Oberthür 2009). However, with a few exceptions 
(Oberthür/Gehring 2006; Zelli 2011), studies of institutional complexity suffice with a simple 
stocktaking paired with abstract conceptual approaches, and have not heeded the call for 
more theoretical approaches (Young 2008). 
Yet, there is a rich theoretical basis that can be drawn upon, including theories from 
international relations (e.g. neoliberal institutionalism and social constructivism), law (e.g. 
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fragmentation of international law) and organization studies (e.g. organizational ecology). 
These theories can be used to explain the underlying causes of institutional complexity, the 
behaviour of state and nonstate actors in complex settings, as well as the consequences of 
complexity. Such insights, in turn, can help inform policy responses (Zelli/van Asselt 2013). 
In this paper we introduced a two-step approach (section 2.2), building on problem-structural 
approaches and the private authority theory. From these literatures we derived assumptions to 
explain the values we will find in our three case studies for our two sets of criteria (degree of 
institutional integration and functions of private and public institutions).  
In the next version of this paper we will present an application of this framework and hope to 
shed more light on the reasons for the observed degree of institutional complexity and the 
roles of private institutions in the fields of REDD, SLCP and climate engineering.   
 
Outlook to further research on complexity and governance architecture mixes 
This said, there are of course a large set of further hypotheses that could be derived from 
different strand of institutionalism and that merit attention and examination in future studies. 
To give but an illustration: apart from the problem-structural approach we pursued here, 
scholars may look into the following hypotheses when they seek to explain the degrees 
institutional complexity: 
- Power-based, drawing on neo-realist perspectives (e.g. Benvenisti/Downs 2007): The 
more a powerful coalition of countries does not find its interests on an issue realized 
by existing institutions, the more this coalition tends to create or support alternative 
ones—thereby increasing the level of institutional complexity. 
- Interest-based, drawing on neoliberal institutionalism (e.g. Keohane/Nye 1977): The 
more asymmetric the constellation of interest among key actors on an issue, the lower 
are chances for regulating this issue comprehensively in a single institution or a small 
set of institutions—thereby increasing the level of institutional complexity. 
- Norms-based, building on sociological and discursive institutionalism (Zelli et al. 
2013): The stronger the conflict among core norms (or the contestation of discourses) 
on an issue, the higher the chances for this conflict to be reflected in a competing set 
of institutions—thereby increasing the level of institutional complexity. 
Apart from such classical assumptions, recent progress in institutional analysis points towards 
more specific factors like, for instance, the solidification of state interests or the 
substitutability of intergovernmental institutions (Jinnah 2014).  
Likewise, there are other types of dependent variables that merit examination, including the 
consequences of the observed degree of complexity for questions of legitimacy, 
accountability or effectiveness of a whole governance architecture or particular institutions 
therein. This perspective would further extend the (assumed) causal chain and put more 
requirements on a thorough analysis. But it would equip us with a more accurate analytical 
insight into core aspects of institutions in global governance today, taking their 
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